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Abstract Android’s success makes it a prominent target for malicious
software. However, the user has very limited control over security-relevant
operations. This work presents AppGuard, a powerful and flexible secu-
rity system that overcomes these deficiencies. It enforces user-defined
security policies on untrusted Android applications without requiring
any changes to a smartphone’s firmware, root access, or the like. Fine-
grained and stateful security policies are expressed in a formal specifi-
cation language, which also supports secrecy requirements. Our system
offers complete mediation of security-relevant methods based on callee-
site inline reference monitoring and supports widespread deployment. In
the experimental analysis we demonstrate the removal of permissions
for overly curious apps as well as how to defend against several recent
real-world attacks on Android phones. Our technique exhibits very little
space and runtime overhead. The utility of AppGuard has already been
demonstrated by more than 1,000,000 downloads.
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1 Introduction
The rapidly increasing number of mobile devices creates a vast potential
for misuse. Mobile devices store a plethora of information about our per-
sonal lives, and GPS, camera, or microphone offer the ability to track us at
all times. The always-online nature of mobile devices makes them a clear
target for overly curious or maliciously spying apps and Trojan horses.
For instance, social network apps were recently criticized for silently up-
loading the user’s entire contacts onto external servers [17,42]. While this
behavior became publicly known, users are most often not even aware of
what an app actually does with their data. Additionally, fixes for secu-
rity vulnerabilities in the Android OS often take months until they are
integrated into vendor-specific OSs. Between Google’s fix with a public
vulnerability description and the vendor’s update, an unpatched system
becomes the obvious target for exploits.
Android’s security concept is based on isolation of third-party apps
and access control [1]. Access to personal information has to be explicitly
granted at install time: When installing an app a list of permissions is
displayed, which have to be granted in order to install the app. Users can
neither dynamically grant and revoke permissions at runtime, nor add
restrictions according to their personal needs. Further, users (and often
even developers, cf. [23, 26]) usually do not have enough information to
judge whether a permission is indeed required.
Contributions. To overcome the aforementioned limitations of Android’s
security system, we present a novel policy-based security framework for
Android called AppGuard.
– AppGuard takes an untrusted app and user-defined security policies
as input and embeds the security monitor into the untrusted app,
thereby delivering a secured self-monitoring app.
– Security policies are formalized in an automata-based language that
can be configured in AppGuard. Security policies may specify restric-
tions on method invocations as well as secrecy requirements.
– AppGuard is built upon a novel approach for callee-site inline refer-
ence monitoring (IRM). We redirect method calls to the embedded
security monitor and check whether executing the call is allowed by
the security policy. Technically, this is achieved by altering method
references in the Dalvik VM. This approach does not require root ac-
cess or changes to the underlying Android architecture and, therefore,
supports widespread deployment as a stand-alone app. It can handle
even JAVA reflection (cf. section 3) and dynamically loaded code.
– Secrecy requirements are enforced by storing the secret within the
security monitor. Apps are just provided with a handle to that se-
cret. This mechanism is general enough to enforce the confidential-
ity of data persistently stored on the device (e.g., address book en-
tries or geolocation) as well as of dynamically received data (e.g.,
user-provided passwords or session tokens received in a single sign-on
protocol). The monitor itself is protected against manipulation of its
internal state and forceful extraction of stored secrets.
– We support fully-automatic on-the-phone instrumentation (no root re-
quired) of third-party apps and automatic updates of rewritten apps
such that no app data is lost. Our system has been downloaded by
about 1,000,000 users (aggregated from [5, 12, 34]) and has been in-
vited to the Samsung Apps market.
– Our evaluation on typical Android apps has shown very little over-
head in terms of space and runtime. The case studies demonstrate
the effectiveness of our approach: we successfully revoked permissions
of excessively curious apps, demonstrate complex policies, and pre-
vent several recent real-world attacks on Android phones, both due to
in-app and OS vulnerabilities. We finally show that for the vast ma-
jority of 25,000 real-world apps, our instrumentation does not break
functionality, thus demonstrating the robustness of our approach.
Key Design Decisions & Closely Related Work. Researchers have
proposed several approaches to overcome the limitations of Android’s
security system, most of which require modifications to the Android plat-
form. While there is hope that Google will eventually introduce a more
fine-grained security system, we decided to directly integrate the secu-
rity monitor within the apps, thereby requiring no change to the Android
platform. The major drawback of modifying the firmware and platform
code is that it requires rooting the device, which may void the user’s war-
ranty and affect the system stability. Besides, there is no general Android
system but a plethora of vendor-specific variants that would need to be
supported and maintained across OS updates. Finally, laymen users typi-
cally lack the expertise to conduct firmware modifications, and, therefore,
abstain from installing modified Android versions.
Aurasium [45], a recently proposed tool for enforcing security policies
in Android apps, rewrites low-level function pointers of the libc library
in order to intercept interactions between the app and the OS. A lot of
the functionality that is protected by Android’s permission system de-
pends on such system calls and thus can be intercepted at this level. A
limitation of this approach is that the parameters of the original Java
requests need to be recovered from the system calls’ low-level byte arrays
in order to differentiate malicious requests from benign ones, which “is
generally difficult to write and test” [45] and may break in the next ver-
sion of Android at Google’s discretion. Similarly, mock return values are
difficult to inject at this low level. In contrast, we designed our system
to intercept high-level Java calls, which allows for more flexible policies.
In particular we are able to inject arbitrary mock return values, e.g. a
proxy object that only gives access to certain data, in case of policy vi-
olations. Additionally, we are able to intercept security-relevant methods
that do not depend on the libc library. As an example consider the policy
that systematically replaces MD5, which is nowadays widely considered
an insecure hashing algorithm, by SHA-1. Since the implementation of
MD5 does not use any security-relevant functionality of the libc library,
this policy cannot be expressed in Aurasium. Finally, it is worth to men-
tion that both Aurasium and AppGuard offer only limited guarantees for
Table 1. Comparison of Android IRM approaches
Feature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Runtime Overhead
Aurasium [45] X – I G# X – – – 14-35%
Dr. Android [35] X – E G# G# – – – 10-50%
I-ARM-Droid [15] X – I – G# – – X 16%
AppGuard X X I G# X X X X 1-21%
Legend: 1. No Firmware Mod. 2. On Phone Instr./Updates 3. Monitor
4. Native Methods 5. Reflection 6. Policy Lang. 7. Data Secrecy
8. Parametric Joinpoints; X: full support, G#: partial support
apps incorporating native code. Aurasium can detect an app that tries to
perform security-relevant operations directly from native code, under the
assumption, however, that the code does not re-implement the libc func-
tionality. Our approach can monitor Java methods invoked from native
code, although it cannot monitor system calls from native code.
Jeon et al. [35] advocate to place the reference monitor into a separate
application. Their approach removes all permissions from the monitored
app, as all calls to sensitive functionality are done in the monitoring app.
This is fail-safe by default as it prevents both reflection and native code
from executing such functionality. However, it has some drawbacks: If a
security policy depends on the state of the monitored app, this approach
incurs high complexity and overhead as all relevant data must be mar-
shaled to the monitor. Besides, the monitor may not yet be initialized
when the app attempts to perform security-relevant operations. Finally,
this approach does not follow the principle of least privilege since the mon-
itor must have the permissions of all monitored apps, making it a promi-
nent target for privilege escalation attacks [9]. We propose a different
approach: Although the security policies are specified and stored within
AppGuard, the policy enforcement mechanism is directly integrated and
performed within the monitored apps. The policy configuration file is
passed as input to the security monitor embedded in each app, thereby
enabling dynamic policy configuration updates. This approach does not
involve any inter-procedure calls and obeys the principle of least privilege,
as AppGuard requires no special permissions. Hence, AppGuard is not
prone to privilege escalation attacks.
Table 1 compares AppGuard with the most relevant related work that
does not modify the firmware. Up to now, no other system can instru-
ment an app and update apps directly on the phone. Dr. Android has
an external monitor (E) accessed via IPC; the other three approaches
use internal monitors (I). Aurasium can monitor security-relevant native
methods, Dr. Android only removes their permissions, which may lead
to unexpected program termination, whereas our tool can prevent calls
to sensitive Java APIs from native code. Both Aurasium and AppGuard
handle reflection; Dr. Android does not handle it; I-ARM-Droid prevents
it altogether. AppGuard is the only system that offers a high-level spec-
ification language for policies and supports hiding of secret data from
e.g. untrusted components in the monitored app. Both Aurasium and Dr.
Android only support a fixed set of joinpoints where a security policy
can be attached to. In contrast, I-ARM-Droid and AppGuard can instru-
ment calls to any Java method. The last column displays the runtime
overhead incurred in micro-benchmarks as reported by the respective au-
thors. AppGuard is competitive in terms of runtime overhead with respect
to concurrent efforts. In our previous work [44] we presented the initial
idea for diverting method calls in the Dalvik VM with a rudimentary
implementation for micro-benchmarks only. It did not support a policy
language, secrecy, and on-the-phone instrumentation, and did not include
case studies. A recent tool paper [3] presented a previous version of App-
Guard, which is based on caller-site instrumentation.
2 AppGuard
Runtime policy enforcement for third-party apps is challenging on unmod-
ified Android systems. Android’s security concept strictly isolates differ-
ent apps installed on the same device. Communication between apps is
only possible via Android’s inter-process communication (IPC) mecha-
nism. However, such communication requires both parties to cooperate,
rendering this channel unsuitable for a generic runtime monitor. Apps
cannot gain elevated privileges to observe the behavior of other apps.
AppGuard tackles this problem by following an approach pioneered by
Erlingsson and Schneider [21] called inline reference monitor (IRM). The
basic idea is to rewrite an untrusted app such that the code that monitors
the app is directly embedded into its code. To this end, IRM systems in-
corporate a rewriter or inliner component, that injects additional security
checks at critical points into the app’s bytecode. This enables the monitor
to observe a trace of security-relevant events, which typically correspond
to invocations of trusted system library methods from the untrusted app.
To actually enforce a security policy, the monitor controls the execution
of the app by suppressing or altering calls to security-relevant methods,
or even terminating the program if necessary.
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Figure 1. Schematics of AppGuard
In the IRM context, a policy is typically specified by means of a secu-
rity automaton that defines which sequences of security-relevant events
are acceptable. Such policies have been shown to express exactly the
policies enforceable by runtime monitoring [43]. Ligatti et al. differen-
tiate security automata by their ability to enforce policies by manipulat-
ing the trace of the program [37]. Some IRM systems [16, 21] implement
truncation automata, which can only terminate the program if it devi-
ates from the policy. However, this is often undesirable in practice. Edit
automata [37] transform the program trace by inserting or suppressing
events. Monitors based on edit automata are able to react gracefully to
policy violations, e.g., by suppressing an undesired method call and re-
turning a mock value, thus allowing the program to continue.
AppGuard is an IRM system for Android with the transformation
capabilities of an edit automaton. Figure 1 provides a high-level overview
of our system. We distinguish three main components:
1. A set of security policies. On top of user-defined and app-specific poli-
cies, AppGuard provides various generic security policies that govern
access to platform API methods which are protected by coarse-grained
Android permissions. These methods comprise, e.g., methods for read-
ing personal data, creating network sockets, or accessing device hard-
ware like the GPS or the camera. As a starting point for the security
policies, we used a mapping from API methods to permissions [23].
2. The program rewriter. Android apps run within a register-based Java
VM called Dalvik. Our rewriter manipulates Dalvik executable (dex)
bytecode of untrusted Android apps and embeds the security monitor
into the untrusted app. The references of the Dalvik VM are altered
so as to redirect the method calls to the security monitor.
3. A management component. AppGuard offers a graphical user inter-
face that allows the user to set individual policy configurations on
a per-app basis. In particular, policies can be turned on or off and
parameterized. In addition, the management component keeps a de-
tailed log of all security-relevant events, enabling the user to monitor
the behavior of an app.
3 Architecture
AppGuard [5] is a stand-alone Android app written in Java and C that
comprises about 9000 lines of code. It builds upon the dexlib library,
which is part of the smali disassembler for Android by Ben Gruver [30],
for manipulating dex files. The size of the app package is roughly 2 Mb.
Instrumentation. IRM systems instrument a target app such that the
control flow of the program is diverted to the security monitor whenever
a security-relevant method is about to be invoked. There are two strate-
gies for passing control to the monitor: Either at the call-site in the app
code, right before the invocation of the security-relevant method, or at
the callee-site, i.e. at the beginning of the security-relevant method. The
latter strategy is simpler and more efficient, because callee sites are easily
identified and less in number [7]. Furthermore, callee-site rewriting can
handle obfuscated apps as it does not require to “understand” the un-
trusted code. Unfortunately, in our setting, standard callee-site rewriting
is not feasible for almost all security-relevant methods, as they are defined
in Android system libraries, which cannot be modified.
In order to achieve the same effect as callee-site rewriting, AppGuard
uses a novel dynamic call-interposition approach [44]. It diverts calls to
security-relevant methods to functions in the monitor (called guards) that
perform a security check. In order to divert the control flow we replace
the reference to a method’s bytecode in the VM’s internal representation
(e.g., a virtual method table) with the reference to our security guard. The
security guards reside in an external library that is dynamically loaded
on app startup. Therefore, we do not need to reinstrument the app when
a security policy is modified. Additionally, we store the original reference
in order to access the original function later on, e.g., in case the security
check grants the permission to execute the security-critical method. This
procedure also reduces the risk of accidentally introducing infinite loops
by a policy since we usually call the original method.
With this approach, invocations of security-relevant methods do not
need to be rewritten statically. Instead, we use Java Native Interface
(JNI) calls at runtime to replace the references to each of the monitored
functions. More precisely, we call the JNI method GetMethodID() which
takes a method’s signature, and returns a pointer to the internal data
structure describing that method. This data structure contains a refer-
public class Main {
public static void main(String[] args) {
A.foo() ; // calls A.foo()
MethodHandle A_foo = Instrumentation.replaceMethod(
"Lcom/test/A;->foo()", "Lcom/test/B;->bar()");
A.foo() ; // calls B.bar()
Instrumentation.callOriginalMethod(A_foo); // calls A.foo()
}}
Figure 2. Example illustrating the functionality of the instrumentation library
ence to the bytecode instructions associated with the method, as well as
metadata such as the method’s argument types or the number of registers.
In order to redirect the control flow to our guard method, we overwrite
the reference to the instructions such that it points to the instructions
of the security guard’s method instead. Additionally, we adjust the inter-
cepted method’s metadata (e.g., number of registers) to be compatible
with the guard method’s code. This approach works both for pure Java
methods and methods with a native implementation.
Figure 2 illustrates how to redirect a method call using our instrumen-
tation library. Calling Instrumentation.replaceMethod() replaces the instruc-
tion reference of method foo() of class com.test.A with the reference to the
instructions of method bar() of class com.test.B. It returns the original ref-
erence, which we store in a variable A_foo. Calling A.foo() will now invoke
B.bar() instead. The original method can still be invoked by Instrumentation.
callOriginalMethod(A_foo). Note that the handle A_foo will be a secret of
the security monitor in practice. Therefore the original method can no
longer be invoked directly by the instrumented app.
Policies. We developed a high-level policy language called SOSPoX in
order to express and characterize the security policies supported by App-
Guard. SOSPoX is based on SPoX [31, 32] and is a direct encoding of
edit automata. SOSPoX policies enable the specification of constraints
on the execution of method calls as well as changes of the control flow.
This includes the specification of a graceful reaction to policy violations,
e.g., by suppressing an undesired method call and returning a mock value,
thus allowing the program to continue. Furthermore, SOSPoX offers sup-
port for confidentiality policies. Data returned by method invocations
are labeled as either confidential or public: confidential data can only be
processed by the methods authorized by the policy. In general, we can
specify information flow policies that prevent both explicit flows (i.e.,
SI=[ ] SI=[id1]
id1=call int getCreditCardNum()
setsec (id1)
id2=call byte [] encrypt(id1)
Figure 3. Security automaton exemplifying declassification by encryption
through assignments) and implicit flows (i.e., through the control flow of
the program). This can be achieved by a policy disallowing the process-
ing of confidential data. Declassification policies allow selected methods
to process confidential data and the returned results are labeled as pub-
lic. For instance, we can specify that the return value of a function that
returns our credit card number is to be kept secret, but that the encryp-
tion of the returned credit card number counts as declassification and
is no longer secret (cf. Figure 3). Due to space constraints we omit the
technical details of our policies and refer to [2] for a more comprehensive
presentation and additional policy examples.
Rewriter. The task of the rewriter component is to insert code into the
target app, which dynamically loads the monitor package into the app’s
virtual machine. To ensure instrumentation of security-sensitive methods
before their execution, we create an application class that becomes the
superclass of the existing application class3. Our new class contains a
static initializer, which becomes the very first code executed upon app
startup. The initializer uses a custom class loader to load our monitor
package. Afterwards, it calls an initializer method in the monitor that
uses the instrumentation library to rewrite the method references.
Separation of Secrets. Policies in our system can specify that the return
values of certain functions are to be kept secret. In order to prevent an app
from leaking secret values, we control access to these secrets. To this end,
the monitor intercepts all calls to methods that the policy annotates as
“secret-carrying”, i.e. methods that can produce secret output or receive
secret input. Whenever the invocation of such a method produces a new
secret output, the monitor returns a dummy value, which serves as a
reference to the secret for further processing. If such a secret reference
is passed to a method that supports secret parameters, the trampoline
method invokes the original method with the corresponding secret instead
and returns either the actual result or a new secret reference, in case the
return value was marked as secret in the policy. The dummy reference
values do not contain any information about the secret itself and are thus
innocuous if processed by any method that is not annotated in the policy.
3 In case no application class exists, we register our class as the application class.
Figure 4. Permission configuration for
the Tiny Flashlight app
Figure 5. Log of security-relevant opera-
tions
Management. The management component of AppGuard monitors the
behavior of instrumented apps and offers policy configuration at run-
time. This configuration is provided to the instrumented app as a world-
readable file. Its location is hardcoded into the monitor during the rewrit-
ing process. This is motivated by the fact that invocations of security-
relevant methods can occur before the management app is fully initial-
ized and able to react on Android IPC. The management component
provides a log of all security-relevant method invocations for each app,
which enables the user to make informed decisions about the current pol-
icy configuration. Invocations are reported to the management app using
a standard Android Service component. The asynchronous nature of An-
droid IPC is not an issue, since security-relevant method invocations that
occur before the service connection is established are buffered locally.
Monitor Protection. In our system, the inlined monitor is part of the
monitored app. A malicious app might try to circumvent the monitor
by tampering with its internal state. Furthermore, an app could try to
subvert secrecy policies by directly extracting stored secrets from the
monitor. Since the monitor package containing secret data and pointers
to the original methods is unknown at compile time and due to strong
typing, a malicious app would need to rely on reflection to access the
monitor. To thwart such attacks, we implement a ReflectionPolicy that
intercepts function calls to the Reflection API. In particular, we monitor
operations that access Java classes and fields like java .lang.Class->forName()
or java .lang.Class->getField() and thereby effectively prevent access to the
monitor package.
Deployment. On unmodified Android systems, app sandboxing prevents
direct modifications of the code of other apps installed on the device.
AppGuard leverages the fact that the app packages of installed third-
party apps are stored in a world-readable location in the filesystem. Thus
the monitor is capable of inlining any app installed on the device by
processing the corresponding apk file. In the end, AppGuard produces a
self-monitoring app package that replaces the original version. Since stock
Android does not allow automatic (un)installation of other apps, the user
is prompted to confirm both the removal of the original app as well as
the installation of the instrumented app. Moreover, we ask the user to
enable the OS-option “Unknown sources: Allow installation of apps from
sources other than the Play Store”. Due to these two user interactions,
no root privileges are required for AppGuard.
All Android apps need to be signed with a developer key. Since our
rewriting process breaks the original signature, we sign the modified app
with a new key. Apps signed with the same key can access each other’s
data if they declare so in their manifests. Thus, we sign rewritten apps
with keys based on their original signatures in order to preserve the origi-
nal behavior. In particular, two apps that were originally signed with the
same key, are signed with the same new key after the rewriting process.
Finally, due to the different signature, instrumented apps would no
longer receive automatic updates, which may negatively impact device
security. Therefore, AppGuard assumes the role of the Play Store app
and checks for updates of instrumented apps. If a new version is found,
AppGuard prompts to download the app package, instruments it and
replaces the existing version of the app.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we present the results of our experimental evaluation. We
used a Google Galaxy Nexus smartphone (1.2 GHz, two cores, 1GB RAM)
with Android 4.1.2 for on-the-phone evaluations and a notebook with an
Intel Core i5-2520M CPU (2.5 GHz, two cores, hyper-threading) and 8GB
RAM for off-the-phone evaluations.
4.1 Robustness and Performance Evaluation
Robustness. We tested AppGuard on more than 25,000 apps from two
different app markets and report the results in Table 2. The stability of
the original apps is tested using the UI/Application Exerciser Monkey
Table 2. Robustness of rewriting and monitoring
App Market Apps Stable Dex verified Stable Instr.
Google Play 9508 8783 9508 (100%) 8744 (99.6%)
SlideMe 15974 14590 15974 (100%) 14469 (99.1%)
Total 25482 23373 25482 (100%) 23213 (99.3%)
provided by the Android framework with a random seed and 1000 in-
jected events (third column). To evaluate the robustness of the rewriting
process we check the validity of the generated dex file (fourth column)
and test the stability of the instrumented app using the UI Monkey with
the random seed (fifth column). Note that we only consider the stability
of instrumented apps where the original did not crash.
The reported numbers indicate a very high reliability of the instrumen-
tation process: we found no illegal dex file and over 99% of the stable apps
were also stable after the instrumentation. The majority of the remain-
ing 1% does not handle checked exceptions gracefully (e.g. IOException),
which may be thrown by AppGuard when suppressing a function call.
This bad coding style is not found in popular apps. Other apps termi-
nate when they detect a different app signature. In rare cases, the mock
values returned by suppressed function calls violate an invariant of the
program. Note, however, that our test with the UI Monkey does not check
for semantic equivalence.
Performance. AppGuard modifies apps installed on an Android device
by adding code at the bytecode level. We analyze the time it takes to
rewrite an app and its impact on both size and execution time of the
modified app. Table 3 provides an overview of our performance evaluation
for the rewriting process. We tested AppGuard with 8 apps and list the
following results for each of the apps: size of the original app package
(Apk), size of the classes .dex file, and the duration of the rewriting process
both on the laptop and smartphone (PC and Phone, respectively).
The size of the classes .dex file increases on average by approximately
3.7 Kb. This increase results from merging code that loads the monitor
package into the app. Since we perform callee-site rewriting and load the
our external policies dynamically, we only have this static and no propor-
tional increase of the original dex file. For a few apps (e.g. Angry Birds)
the instrumentation time is dominated by re-building and compressing
the app package file (which is essentially a zip archive). The evaluation
also clearly reveals the difference in computing power between the laptop
Table 3. Sizes of apk and dex files with rewriting time on PC and phone.
App (Version) Size [Kb] Time [sec]
Apk Dex PC Phone
Angry Birds (2.0.2) 15018 994 5.8 39.3
Endomondo (7.0.2) 3263 1635 0.7 16.6
Facebook (1.8.3) 4013 2695 1.2 26.4
Instagram (1.0.3) 12901 3292 3.0 44.3
Tiny Flashlight (4.7) 1287 485 0.1 2.9
Twitter (3.0.1) 2218 764 0.3 8.9
Wetter.com (1.3.1) 4296 958 0.4 10.7
WhatsApp (2.7.3581) 5155 3182 0.8 27.7
Table 4. Runtime comparison with micro-benchmarks for normal function calls and
guarded function calls with policies disabled as well as the introduced runtime overhead.
Function Call Original Call Guarded Call Overhead
Socket-><init>() 0.0186 ms 0.0212 ms 21.4%
ContentResolver->query() 19.5229 ms 19.4987 ms 0.8%
Camera->open() 74.498 ms 79.476 ms 6.4%
and the phone. While the rewriting process takes considerably more time
on the phone than on the laptop, we argue that this should not be a major
concern as the rewriter is only run once per app.
The runtime overhead introduced by the inline reference monitor is
measured through micro-benchmarks (cf. Table 4.) We compare the exe-
cution time of single function calls in three different settings: the original
code with no instrumentation, the instrumented code with disabled poli-
cies (i.e. policy enforcement turned off.), and the incurred overhead. We
list the average execution time for each function call. For all function
calls the instrumentation adds a small runtime overhead due to addi-
tional code. If we enabled policies, the changed control flow usually leads
to shorter execution times and renders them incomparable. Even with
disabled policies the incurred runtime overhead is negligible and does not
adversely affect the app’s performance.
4.2 Case Study Evaluation
We evaluate our framework in several case studies by applying different
policies to real world apps from Google Play [28] (cf. Table 3 for the
analyzed versions). As a disclaimer, we would like to point out that we use
apps from the market for exemplary purposes only, without implications
regarding their security unless we state this explicitly.
For our evaluation, we implemented 9 different policies. Five of them
are designed to revoke critical Android platform permissions, in partic-
ular the Internet permission (InternetPolicy), access to camera and audio
hardware (CameraPolicy, AudioPolicy), and permissions to read contacts and
calendar entries (ContactsPolicy, CalendarPolicy). Furthermore, we introduce
a complex policy that tracks possible fees incurred by untrusted applica-
tions (CostPolicy). The HttpsRedirectPolicy and MediaStorePolicy address se-
curity issues in third-party apps and the OS. Finally, the ReflectionPolicy
described in section 3 monitors invocations of Java’s Reflection API and
an app-specific policy. In the following case studies, we highlight 7 of these
policies and evaluate them in detail on real-world apps.
Our case studies focus on (a) the possibility to revoke standard An-
droid permissions. Additionally, it is possible to (b) enforce fine-grained
policies that are not supported by Android’s existing permission sys-
tem. Our framework provides quick-fixes and mitigation for vulnerabili-
ties both in (c) third-party apps and (d) the operating system4. Finally,
we present a general security policy that is completely independent of
Android’s permission system.
Revoking Android permissions. Many Android applications request
more permissions than necessary. AppGuard gives users the chance to
safely revoke permissions at any time at a fine-grained level.
Case study: Twitter. As an example for the revocation of permissions,
we chose the official app of the popular micro-blogging service Twitter. It
attracted attention in the media [42] for secretly uploading phone numbers
and email addresses stored in the user’s address book to the Twitter
servers. While the app “officially” requests the permissions to access both
Internet and the user’s contact data, it did not indicate that this data
would be copied off the phone as part of the “Find friends” feature that
makes friend suggestions based on the user’s address book. As a result of
the public disclosure, the current version of the app now explicitly informs
the user before uploading any personal information.
To prevent leakage of private information, we block access to the
user’s contact list. Since friends can also be added manually, AppGuard’s
ContactsPolicy protects the user’s privacy while losing only minor conve-
nience functionality. The actual policy enforcement is done by monitoring
queries to the ContentResolver, which serves as a centralized access point
4 By providing policy recommendations based on a crowdsourcing approach, even
laymen users can enforce complex policies (e.g. to fix OS vulnerabilities)
to Android’s various databases. Data is identified by a URI, which we
examine to selectively block queries to the contact list by returning a
mock result object. Our tests were carried out on an older version of the
Twitter app, which was released prior to their fix.
Case study: Tiny Flashlight. The app either uses the camera’s flash LED
as a flashlight, or turns the whole screen white and requests the permis-
sions to access the Internet and the camera. Manual analysis indicates
that the Internet permission is only required to display online ads. How-
ever, together with the camera, this app could potentially be abused for
spying purposes, which would be hard to detect without detailed code or
traffic analysis. AppGuard can block Internet access of the app with the
InternetPolicy, which blocks the in-app ads. We monitor constructor calls
of the various Socket classes, the java .net.url .openConnection() method as
well as several other network I/O functions, and throw an IOException if
access to the Internet is forbidden.
Enforcing fine-grained policies. AppGuard can also add new restric-
tions to functionalities that are not restricted by the current permission
system or that are already protected, but not in the desired way. For ex-
ample, from the user’s point of view most apps should only communicate
with a limited set of servers. The wetter.com app provides weather infor-
mation and should only communicate with its servers to query weather
information. The InternetPolicy of AppGuard provides fine grained Inter-
net access based on per-app white-listing of web servers. For this app we
restrict Internet access with the regular-expression ^(.+\.)?wetter\.com$,
which blocks potentially harmful connections to other servers. White-
listing can be configured in the management interface by selecting from
a list of hosts the app has already attempted to connect to.
Quick-fixes for vulnerabilities in third-party apps. Although most
apps use encrypted https for the login procedures to web servers, there
are apps that return to unencrypted http after successful login, thereby
transmitting their authentication tokens in plain text over the Internet.
Attackers could eavesdrop on the connection to impersonate the user [36].
Endomondo Sports Tracker returns to http after successful login, thereby
leaking the authentication token. As the Web server supports https for the
whole session, the HttpsRedirectPolicy of AppGuard enforces the permanent
usage of https, which protects the user’s account and data from identity
theft. Depending on the monitored function, we return the redirected https
connection or the content from the redirected connection.
Mitigation for operating system vulnerabilities. We also found our
tool useful to mitigate operating system vulnerabilities. As we cannot
change the operating system itself, we instrument all apps with a global
security policy to prevent exploits. For example, Android apps do not
require a special permission to access the photo storage. Any app with
the Internet permission could thus leak private photos without the user’s
knowledge. We address this problem with a global MediaStorePolicy policy
that monitors calls to the ContentResolver object. Moreover, any app could
use the Android browser to leak arbitrary data, by sending an appropriate
Intent. The InternetPolicy monitors the startActivity (Intent) calls and throws
an exception if the particular intent is not allowed. It thereby also prevents
the local cross-site scripting attack [4] against the Android browser that
was present up to Android 2.3.4. Using a combination of VIEW intents, it
was possible to trick the browser into executing arbitrary JavaScript code
within the domain of the attacker’s choice, which enabled the attacker to
steal login information or even silently install additional apps.
Threats to Validity. Like any IRM system, AppGuard’s monitor runs
within the same process as the target app. This makes it vulnerable to
attacks from malicious apps that try to bypass or disable the security
monitor. Our instrumentation technique is robust against attacks from
Java code, as this code is strongly typed. It can handle cases like re-
flection or dynamically loaded libraries. However, a malicious app could
use native code to disable the security monitor by altering the references
we modified or tampering with the AppGuard’s bytecode instructions or
data structures. To prevent this, we could block the execution of any un-
trusted native code by intercepting calls to System.loadLibrary(), which is,
however, not a viable solution in practice. Currently, AppGuard warns
the user if an app attempts to execute untrusted native code.
In order to assess the potential impact of native code on our approach,
we analyzed the percentage of apps that rely on it. Our evaluation [2] on
25,000 apps (cf. Table 5) revealed that about 15% include native libraries,
which is high compared to the 5% of apps reported in [46]. We conjecture
that this difference is due to the composition of our sample. It consists of
30% games, which on Android frequently build upon native code based
game engines (e.g., libGDX or Unity) to improve performance. Ignoring
games, we found only 9% of the apps to be using native code, which makes
AppGuard a safe solution for over 90% of these apps.
AppGuard monitors the invocation of security-relevant methods, which
are typically part of the Android framework API. By reimplementing
parts of this API and directly calling into lower layers of the framework,
a malicious app could circumvent the security monitor. This attack vec-
tor is always available to attackers in IRM systems that monitor method
Table 5. Ratio of apps using native code
App Market Overall Games No games
Apps Nat. code Apps Nat. code Apps Nat. code
Google Play 9508 2212 (23%) 2838 1110 (39%) 6670 1102 (16%)
SlideMe 15974 1693 (10%) 5920 1244 (21%) 10054 449 (4.5%)
Total 25482 3905 (15%) 8758 2354 (26%) 16724 1551 (9.2%)
invocations. Furthermore, AppGuard is not designed to be stealthy: due
to the resigning of apps, instrumentation transparency cannot be guar-
anteed. There are many apps that verify their own signature (e.g. from
the Amazon AppStore). If they rely on Android API to retrieve their
own signature, however, AppGuard can hook these functions to return
the original signature, thus concealing its presence. An app could also de-
tect the presence of AppGuard by looking for the presence of AppGuard
classes in the virtual machine. In the end, both of these attacks boil down
to an arms race, that a determined attacker will win. Up to now, we did
not detect any app that tried to explicitly circumvent AppGuard.
Our instrumentation approach relies only on the layout of Dalvik’s in-
ternal data structure for methods, which has not changed since the initial
version of Android. However, our instrumentation system could easily be
adapted if the layout were to change in future versions of Android.
Android programs are multi-threaded by default. Issues of thread
safety could therefore arise in the monitor when considering stateful poli-
cies that take the relative timing of events in different threads into ac-
count. While we did not yet experiment with such policies, we plan to
extend our system to support race-free policies [14] in the future. In con-
trast, policies that atomically decide whether to permit a method call are
also correct in the multithreaded setting.
5 Further Related Work
Researchers have worked on various security aspects of Android and pro-
posed many security enhancements. One line of research [10,18,19,27,41]
targets the detection of privacy leaks and malicious third-party apps.
Another line of work analyzed Android’s permission based access control
system. Barrera et al. [6] conducted an empirical analysis of Android’s
permission system on 1,100 Android apps and suggested improvements
to its granularity. Felt et al. [24] analyzed the effectiveness of app permis-
sions using case studies on Google Chrome extensions and Android apps.
The inflexible and coarse-grained permission system of Android inspired
many researchers to propose extensions [20, 29, 38–40]. Conti et al. [13]
integrate a context-related policy enforcement mechanism into Android.
Fragkaki et al. [25] present an external reference monitor approach to
enforce coarse grained secrecy and integrity policies. In contrast, our in-
tention was to deploy the system to unmodified stock Android phones.
The concept of IRMs has received considerable attention in the lit-
erature. It was first formalized by Erlingsson and Schneider in the de-
velopment of the SASI/PoET/PSLang systems [21,22], which implement
IRM’s for x86 assembly code and Java bytecode. Several other IRM im-
plementations for Java followed. Polymer [8] is a IRM system based on
edit automata, which supports composition of complex security policies
from simple building blocks. The Java-MOP [11] system offers a rich set
of formal policy specification languages. IRM systems have also been de-
veloped for other platforms. Mobile [33] is an extension to Microsoft’s
.NET Common Intermediate Language that supports certified IRM. Fi-
nally, the S3MS.NET Run Time Monitor [16] enforces security policies
expressed in a variety of policy languages for .NET applications.
6 Conclusions
We presented a practical approach to enforce high-level, fine-grained se-
curity policies on stock android phones. It is built upon a novel approach
for callee-site inline reference monitoring and provides a powerful frame-
work for enforcing arbitrary security and secrecy policies. Our system
instruments directly on the phone and allows automatic updates without
losing user data. The system curbs the pervasive overly curious behavior
of Android apps. We enforce complex stateful security policies and miti-
gate vulnerabilities of both third-party apps and the OS. AppGuard goes
even one step beyond being capable of efficiently protecting secret data
from misuse in untrusted apps. Our experimental analysis demonstrates
the robustness of the approach and shows that the overhead in terms of
space and runtime are negligible. The case studies illustrate how App-
Guard prevents several real-world attacks on Android. A recent release of
AppGuard has already been downloaded by more than 1,000,000 users.
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